Euthyphro's Dilemma

There is a philosophical-theological question that has been addressed by many different writers.  The question is whether something is pious (or good or just) because divinity loves it, or is it good for some other reason and divinity only loves is or says it is good because it is good.

Today in lecture, we talked about two possible solutions.

Solution #1 to Euthyphro's Dilemma: What is pious (or good or just) is pious just because divinity says so.	Solution #2 to Euthyphro's Dilemma: What is pious (or good or just) is so because it is so. Divinity loves it or says it is good because it is good, but there is some independent reason why it is good.
If there are many gods, they will disagree about what is pious.	If there are many gods, they will disagree about what is pious.
There is no reason for morality. If divinity can decide that anything is just, good or pious, then it seems somewhat arbitrary. Also, if morality is entirely contingent upon the will of divinity, then if it turns out that there is no divinity, then there is no morality.	Divinity's freedom to decide what is good is limited by an external reason or principle. It seems that divinity is not omnipotent if it cannot decide what is good.
If things are only good because divinity says so, then why is divinity good? Does divinity have to say it is good? Many people think that divinity is good in itself, regardless of any assessment of it.	Divinity's independence, or sovereignty, is limited.  Divinity cannot decide that just anything is good.
This solution requires that we commit the naturalistic fallacy. In other words, we ignore the is/ought distinction. Simply put, just because something is a certain way does not mean that something should be that way. For example, if people are racist, that doesn't mean they should be.