In Nagel's paper "War and Massacre", Nagel attempts to limit utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the view that as long as the greatest number of people are benefited by an action, this outweighs the negative consequences for a few people. The question is whether there is a limit to the extent of the negative consequences that a few can suffer in order for an action to be morally good. Nagel argues that there are some negative consequences that are always wrong, no matter how many people are benefited by an action.
Utilitarianism & Absolutism. Utilitarianism is the view that an action is good or bad based on the consequences. Absolutism is the view that an action itself is good or bad. Absolutists do not think that the consequences alone can justify an action that is bad in itself. Absolutism does not ignore consequences of an action. Absolutism is a limit of utilitarianism, not a substitute. Absolutism is the view that while consequences are relevant to the morality of an action but that some actions are always bad, regardless of consequences. For example, innocent murder of civilians is always bad, even if it brings about good consequences.
Two Restrictions. Nagel argues that whether war is moral depends on how the war is fought. Some things should never be done in war, such as murder of innocent civilians and killing medical personnel. There are two kinds of restrictions of behavior. First, only certain kinds of people should be attacked. For example, only soldiers or paramilitary armed fighters can be attacked. Children and other innocent civilians cannot be attacked. Second, only certain kinds of attack are acceptable. For example, it may be OK to shoot someone, but it is not OK to torture someone or poisoning a water supply. The first is a restriction is on the class (or kind) of people to be attacked and the second is a restriction on the type of hostility that can be used.
Nagel's point is that we cannot only consider consequences when deciding if an action is moral or immoral. Some actions, Nagel says, are bad even if they provide good consequences.
Tuesday, March 8, 2011
Nagel's "Moral Luck" 2: Skepticism and a Response
Nagel is a skeptic when it comes to moral responsibility. He notes the criterion for determining whether an action is good or bad is based on luck, then it is not our choice to be good or bad. In other words, it is impossible to be morally responsible if the only way to tell if an action is good or bad is to look at the consequences determined by luck. If luck determines the rightness or wrongness of an action, then no person is responsible for the consequences of his or her actions.
Sven notes that there are possible responses to this kind of skepticism. We can, like Frankfurt, say that moral responsibility does not depend on free will and control of consequences. Also, we can separate the moral worth of an action from the means of assessing the moral worth of an action. Someone may object to Nagel with an epistemic response to the problem of moral luck. Basically, there may be times that we are unable to know why a person's action is morally good or bad but this does not change the fact that the action is good or bad. Luck does not affect the morality of an action. Luck only affects how or whether I know if an action is morally good or bad.
Sven notes that there are possible responses to this kind of skepticism. We can, like Frankfurt, say that moral responsibility does not depend on free will and control of consequences. Also, we can separate the moral worth of an action from the means of assessing the moral worth of an action. Someone may object to Nagel with an epistemic response to the problem of moral luck. Basically, there may be times that we are unable to know why a person's action is morally good or bad but this does not change the fact that the action is good or bad. Luck does not affect the morality of an action. Luck only affects how or whether I know if an action is morally good or bad.
Nagel's "Moral Luck" 1: The Basics
So far, we have discussed two ethical approaches: utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. These are two different ways to decide if an action is good or bad. Utilitarianism is the view that what is good is what maximizes net happiness. Kant's ethical view is that what is good is what is done for the right reasons, namely that actions are motivated by the good will. Specifically, Kant thinks that an action is moral if and only if the rule being followed can be made a universal law.
In Nagel's article "Moral Luck" , he suggests that utilitarianism must be modified because the consequences of an action are often beyond the control of a person. In short, Nagel argues against a utilitarian position on the grounds that moral actions are not moral merely by luck. If an action only has good consequences because of luck, then we cannot say that the person acting is the source of the moral value of the action. A person whose action is only good because he is lucky is not deserving of moral blame or praise. Likewise, if an action has terrible consequences only due to luck, then the person acting is not blameworthy.
For example, imagine two people: lucky Lae and unlucky Usagi. Lae and Usagi both throw a banana peel out the window. Now, Lae's peel just happens to be picked up by a cleaning crew within minutes. Usagi's banana peel, however, sits on the ground until someone slips and falls on the peel. It is only a matter of luck that determines what the consequences of the action are. Lae and Usagi both perform the same action. Nagel thinks that neither Usagi nor Lae are more morally responsible than the other.
Nagel bases his argument on the control intuition, which is the notion that if the consequences of an action are not in the control of a person, then he or she is not morally responsible for those consequences. In short, you are not responsible for random lucky (or unlucky) consequences of an action. Kant's theory fits in with this view because Kant thinks that only the motive or will behind an action is relevant to whether an action is good or bad. Although Kant does not advocate for the control intuition, his theory is compatible with it, since Kant thinks that unlucky consequences of an action do not make an action bad so long as the action was done for the right reasons.
Nagel describes four different kinds of moral luck. Resultant luck is just luck about the way our actions turn out. For example, when I play the lottery, it is a matter of resultant luck whether I win or lose. Circumstantial luck is luck about what kinds of situations or circumstances are presented to us. For example, it is a result of circumstantial luck which lottery I am able to play. Constitutive luck is luck about what kind of person you are. Namely, the temperament, capacities and inclinations that you have are the result of luck. For example, the fact that I have a strong desire to play the lottery is a result of constitutive luck. Causal luck is luck about how I have been causally determined by previous events and actions. This is really a mix of circumstantial luck and constitutive luck. For example, it is a matter of luck if my unlucky desire to play the lottery and my ability to play the Powerball lottery both cause me to actually play the lottery.
Nagel thinks that resultant luck and circumstantial luck should play and do play a role in determining if an action is good or bad. Nagel thinks that constitutive luck does not and should not play a role in whether an action is moral.
Nagel's argument can be used against both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Utlitarianism is wrong because it allows that luck can determine if a person's action is good or bad, which seems unfair. Kant is wrong because Kant does not seriously consider the importance of consequences for moral assessments. In other words, Kant thinks that acting morally is risk-free.
In Nagel's article "Moral Luck" , he suggests that utilitarianism must be modified because the consequences of an action are often beyond the control of a person. In short, Nagel argues against a utilitarian position on the grounds that moral actions are not moral merely by luck. If an action only has good consequences because of luck, then we cannot say that the person acting is the source of the moral value of the action. A person whose action is only good because he is lucky is not deserving of moral blame or praise. Likewise, if an action has terrible consequences only due to luck, then the person acting is not blameworthy.
For example, imagine two people: lucky Lae and unlucky Usagi. Lae and Usagi both throw a banana peel out the window. Now, Lae's peel just happens to be picked up by a cleaning crew within minutes. Usagi's banana peel, however, sits on the ground until someone slips and falls on the peel. It is only a matter of luck that determines what the consequences of the action are. Lae and Usagi both perform the same action. Nagel thinks that neither Usagi nor Lae are more morally responsible than the other.
Nagel bases his argument on the control intuition, which is the notion that if the consequences of an action are not in the control of a person, then he or she is not morally responsible for those consequences. In short, you are not responsible for random lucky (or unlucky) consequences of an action. Kant's theory fits in with this view because Kant thinks that only the motive or will behind an action is relevant to whether an action is good or bad. Although Kant does not advocate for the control intuition, his theory is compatible with it, since Kant thinks that unlucky consequences of an action do not make an action bad so long as the action was done for the right reasons.
Nagel describes four different kinds of moral luck. Resultant luck is just luck about the way our actions turn out. For example, when I play the lottery, it is a matter of resultant luck whether I win or lose. Circumstantial luck is luck about what kinds of situations or circumstances are presented to us. For example, it is a result of circumstantial luck which lottery I am able to play. Constitutive luck is luck about what kind of person you are. Namely, the temperament, capacities and inclinations that you have are the result of luck. For example, the fact that I have a strong desire to play the lottery is a result of constitutive luck. Causal luck is luck about how I have been causally determined by previous events and actions. This is really a mix of circumstantial luck and constitutive luck. For example, it is a matter of luck if my unlucky desire to play the lottery and my ability to play the Powerball lottery both cause me to actually play the lottery.
Nagel thinks that resultant luck and circumstantial luck should play and do play a role in determining if an action is good or bad. Nagel thinks that constitutive luck does not and should not play a role in whether an action is moral.
Nagel's argument can be used against both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Utlitarianism is wrong because it allows that luck can determine if a person's action is good or bad, which seems unfair. Kant is wrong because Kant does not seriously consider the importance of consequences for moral assessments. In other words, Kant thinks that acting morally is risk-free.
Thursday, March 3, 2011
Kantian Ethics
Kant says that what makes an action good is that it is the result of a good will, or good motivations and intentions. According to him, only the good will is always good. All other good things have the potential to be misused or perverted. For example, being smart can be good if someone uses intelligence to perform good actions. Being smart can also be bad if someone uses his or her intelligence to hurt people. Other kinds of goods that can be perverted are gifts of nature, such as talents of mind (being smart, being funny) and qualities of temperament (courage and resolution) as well as gifts of fortune (power, riches, honor, health and happiness).
Unlike Mill, Kant does not think that happiness is always good. Kant says that happiness is only good if the person who is happy also has a good will. First, he thinks that sometimes happiness makes people arrogant. Being arrogant can make someone insensitive or greedy. Also, when people are happy then they tend to think that they deserve to be happy. Kant thinks that this is problematic because some people don't deserve to be happy if they have not earned their happiness (e.g. lazy people or people who are just really lucky).
Kant thinks that even if the consequences of your action are terrible, an action is moral if you have the right motivations. If someone acts out of his or her good will and has good intentions, then an action is good.
The good will has three features. First, the good will is necessary in order for other things to be good. Second, the good will is the only thing that is always good. Third, the value of the good will is much higher than the value of all the other goods combined.
Conforming with Duty vs. Acting from Duty. It is important to note that Kant does not think that it is enough if our actions just happen to conform (or fit in with) a duty. Rather, one must act from the duty. In other words, one must act because one wants to fulfill his or her duty. For example, your mechanic has a duty to not overcharge you when you bring in your car to get fixed because it's unfair. Now imagine two different mechanics. The first mechanic, Charlie Good, never overcharges his clients because he knows that it is wrong to overcharge people. Charlie acts from duty because he wants to fulfill his duty. The second mechanic, Susy Selfish, would love to overcharge some people, but she knows that if she does so, it will hurt her business. Susy does not act from duty. Susy acts selfishly, so her action merely conforms with duty.
Another example. Doctors have a duty to be honest with their patients out of respect. Now imagine Dr. Duty. Dr Duty always tells his patients the truth because he thinks it is important to respect his patients by being honest. Dr. Duty acts from duty. Now imagine Dr. Meme. Dr. Meme tells his patients the truth but only because he knows that he will lose his medical license if he lies. Dr. Meme conforms with duty but he does not act from duty.
Yet more examples. Another example of someone who does not act from duty is the Happy Helper. The Happy Helper helps others not because he thinks it is the right thing to do. Rather, the Happy Helper only helps others because it makes him feel good about himself. Kant says that the Happy Helper's actions are not morally good or morally worthy. One more example is the honor-obsessed Klingon. A Klingon may perform a "good" action, such as saving the life of her crewmates. This action, however, is not good if she only does so in order to gain honor. Because the Klingon does not act from the good will, her action is not good.
Three Claims about The Good Will and Duty. First, an action has moral worth only if the action is done from duty. Second, acting from duty means respecting the moral law. Third, an action is good not because of the consequences of the action but it is only good because of the maxim (rule or principle) that is being followed when the person acts.
Maxims. An action is good if it follows a good maxim. A maxim is a personal rule or personal principle that guides action. For example, "Never lie to friends and family" may be a personal rule that I follow. This maxim describes the kinds of actions I should perform in a general way.
The Categorical Imperative. The categorical imperative is way to check whether our maxims are good or if our maxims are bad. One version of the categorical imperative is the formula of universal law: only act according to maxims that can rationally be made universal laws. In other words, only follow rules that everyone can and should follow. A rule can be universalized only if doing so is not contradictory. For example, if I have the maxim, "I will lie when I want to" and this rule became universal, then everyone would just lie whenever they wanted to. But a lie is an attempt to deceive someone else. If everyone lied all the time, then nobody would ever expect to hear the truth, so nobody would every be deceived by lies. In short, if everyone lies all the time, lying becomes impossible! Because this rule cannot be universalized, it is a bad rule.
Suicidal Maxim. Imagine suicidal Sally. Sally might want to act according to the maxim, "end your life if living causes more pain than pleasure." Now imagine if this rule were universal. Kant thinks that if every person followed a rule that led them to kill themselves if they expected their lives to be painful, then this would go against life itself and so seems to be irrational. Kant does not think that there can be a world of rational people who follow such a rule. Sven notes that this example is not very convincing.
Promise-Keeping Maxim. Now imagine promise-breaker Bea. Bea follows the personal rule, "I will break promises when I want to." If this rule were universal, then the whole practice of promise-making and promise-keeping would cease to exist. If nobody every kept promises then nobody would ever expect promises to be kept. But a promise means that you expect a person to think that you will not break the promise. Because following the rule to break promises makes this very action impossible, it is impossible for a world of rational people to follow this universal law. Because the maxim cannot be universalized, it is a bad maxim.
In short, Kant thinks that you cannot make yourself an exception to rules.
Unlike Mill, Kant does not think that happiness is always good. Kant says that happiness is only good if the person who is happy also has a good will. First, he thinks that sometimes happiness makes people arrogant. Being arrogant can make someone insensitive or greedy. Also, when people are happy then they tend to think that they deserve to be happy. Kant thinks that this is problematic because some people don't deserve to be happy if they have not earned their happiness (e.g. lazy people or people who are just really lucky).
Kant thinks that even if the consequences of your action are terrible, an action is moral if you have the right motivations. If someone acts out of his or her good will and has good intentions, then an action is good.
The good will has three features. First, the good will is necessary in order for other things to be good. Second, the good will is the only thing that is always good. Third, the value of the good will is much higher than the value of all the other goods combined.
Conforming with Duty vs. Acting from Duty. It is important to note that Kant does not think that it is enough if our actions just happen to conform (or fit in with) a duty. Rather, one must act from the duty. In other words, one must act because one wants to fulfill his or her duty. For example, your mechanic has a duty to not overcharge you when you bring in your car to get fixed because it's unfair. Now imagine two different mechanics. The first mechanic, Charlie Good, never overcharges his clients because he knows that it is wrong to overcharge people. Charlie acts from duty because he wants to fulfill his duty. The second mechanic, Susy Selfish, would love to overcharge some people, but she knows that if she does so, it will hurt her business. Susy does not act from duty. Susy acts selfishly, so her action merely conforms with duty.
Another example. Doctors have a duty to be honest with their patients out of respect. Now imagine Dr. Duty. Dr Duty always tells his patients the truth because he thinks it is important to respect his patients by being honest. Dr. Duty acts from duty. Now imagine Dr. Meme. Dr. Meme tells his patients the truth but only because he knows that he will lose his medical license if he lies. Dr. Meme conforms with duty but he does not act from duty.
Yet more examples. Another example of someone who does not act from duty is the Happy Helper. The Happy Helper helps others not because he thinks it is the right thing to do. Rather, the Happy Helper only helps others because it makes him feel good about himself. Kant says that the Happy Helper's actions are not morally good or morally worthy. One more example is the honor-obsessed Klingon. A Klingon may perform a "good" action, such as saving the life of her crewmates. This action, however, is not good if she only does so in order to gain honor. Because the Klingon does not act from the good will, her action is not good.
Three Claims about The Good Will and Duty. First, an action has moral worth only if the action is done from duty. Second, acting from duty means respecting the moral law. Third, an action is good not because of the consequences of the action but it is only good because of the maxim (rule or principle) that is being followed when the person acts.
Maxims. An action is good if it follows a good maxim. A maxim is a personal rule or personal principle that guides action. For example, "Never lie to friends and family" may be a personal rule that I follow. This maxim describes the kinds of actions I should perform in a general way.
The Categorical Imperative. The categorical imperative is way to check whether our maxims are good or if our maxims are bad. One version of the categorical imperative is the formula of universal law: only act according to maxims that can rationally be made universal laws. In other words, only follow rules that everyone can and should follow. A rule can be universalized only if doing so is not contradictory. For example, if I have the maxim, "I will lie when I want to" and this rule became universal, then everyone would just lie whenever they wanted to. But a lie is an attempt to deceive someone else. If everyone lied all the time, then nobody would ever expect to hear the truth, so nobody would every be deceived by lies. In short, if everyone lies all the time, lying becomes impossible! Because this rule cannot be universalized, it is a bad rule.
Suicidal Maxim. Imagine suicidal Sally. Sally might want to act according to the maxim, "end your life if living causes more pain than pleasure." Now imagine if this rule were universal. Kant thinks that if every person followed a rule that led them to kill themselves if they expected their lives to be painful, then this would go against life itself and so seems to be irrational. Kant does not think that there can be a world of rational people who follow such a rule. Sven notes that this example is not very convincing.
Promise-Keeping Maxim. Now imagine promise-breaker Bea. Bea follows the personal rule, "I will break promises when I want to." If this rule were universal, then the whole practice of promise-making and promise-keeping would cease to exist. If nobody every kept promises then nobody would ever expect promises to be kept. But a promise means that you expect a person to think that you will not break the promise. Because following the rule to break promises makes this very action impossible, it is impossible for a world of rational people to follow this universal law. Because the maxim cannot be universalized, it is a bad maxim.
In short, Kant thinks that you cannot make yourself an exception to rules.
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Utilitarian Ethics 2: Proof of Greatest Happiness Principle and Objections
Mill's Proof of the Greatest Happiness Principle.
(1) if you see something, this proves that it is visible.
(2) Similarly, desiring something proves that it is desirable.
(3) The only thing that each person truly desires is happiness.
(4) The only thing that is truly desirable for a person is his or her own happiness.
(5) Hence each person should perform the actions that promote the greatest happiness.
Three Problems with this Argument:
First, (2) does not follow from (1). Visibility and desirability are not the same kinds of things.
Second, (4) does not follow from (3). To assume that we can derive an "ought" from an "is" is to make the naturalistic fallacy, which is a point made by David Hume.
Third, (5) does not follow from (4). Just because your own happiness is desirable does not mean that the happiness of other people is also desirable.
Further Objections to Utilitarianism:
(1) We cannot always predict what the consequences of our actions will be. It is difficult if not impossible to judge the morality of an action based on what the predicted consequences will be.
(2) It is difficult to quantify pleasures. In other words, it is hard to represent pleasures with numbers in order to determine if happiness will be maximized by an action. Cost-benefit analysis is difficult if not impossible.
(3) Also, the process of trying to determine if an action will maximize happiness is time-consuming and difficult. It is not practical that we will be able to do such a calculation before we perform an action.
(4) Utilitarianism cannot explain special duties or obligations that we have to people like our friends, family and neighbors.
(5) If we only care about sum total happiness, then there will be actions that are good while these actions do cause a great amount of pain for some people. For example, say that six of the seven dwarves decide to torture, beat and murder the Dopey for fun. Even though Dopey experiences a lot of pain, utility is still maximized because the other dwarves are so happy. Thus a utilitarian must say that it is good for the dwarves to murder Dopey.
(6) Utilitarianism fails to respect individual rights. The rights of a single person can be violated as long as the greatest good is still maximized.
(7) Utilitarianism does not address the question of what kind of a person we should be. The focus is entirely on consequences rather than the character of people. For example, if I am offered a job as an assassin, I might think that killing people for a job would be OK because even if I do not take the job, someone else will. This means that whether or not I am an assassin, the consequences are the same, hence the moral value of either choice is equal.
The first three objections do not attack the theory but rather the practice of the theory. Objections (1), (2) and (3) are all objections that the theory is impractical and difficult (if not impossible) to use as a way of making moral decisions. Objections (4), (5), (6) and (7) object on the grounds that the results of utilitarian theory will conflict with strong moral intuitions or other reasons to consider when deciding if an action is good or bad.
(1) if you see something, this proves that it is visible.
(2) Similarly, desiring something proves that it is desirable.
(3) The only thing that each person truly desires is happiness.
(4) The only thing that is truly desirable for a person is his or her own happiness.
(5) Hence each person should perform the actions that promote the greatest happiness.
Three Problems with this Argument:
First, (2) does not follow from (1). Visibility and desirability are not the same kinds of things.
Second, (4) does not follow from (3). To assume that we can derive an "ought" from an "is" is to make the naturalistic fallacy, which is a point made by David Hume.
Third, (5) does not follow from (4). Just because your own happiness is desirable does not mean that the happiness of other people is also desirable.
Further Objections to Utilitarianism:
(1) We cannot always predict what the consequences of our actions will be. It is difficult if not impossible to judge the morality of an action based on what the predicted consequences will be.
(2) It is difficult to quantify pleasures. In other words, it is hard to represent pleasures with numbers in order to determine if happiness will be maximized by an action. Cost-benefit analysis is difficult if not impossible.
(3) Also, the process of trying to determine if an action will maximize happiness is time-consuming and difficult. It is not practical that we will be able to do such a calculation before we perform an action.
(4) Utilitarianism cannot explain special duties or obligations that we have to people like our friends, family and neighbors.
(5) If we only care about sum total happiness, then there will be actions that are good while these actions do cause a great amount of pain for some people. For example, say that six of the seven dwarves decide to torture, beat and murder the Dopey for fun. Even though Dopey experiences a lot of pain, utility is still maximized because the other dwarves are so happy. Thus a utilitarian must say that it is good for the dwarves to murder Dopey.
(6) Utilitarianism fails to respect individual rights. The rights of a single person can be violated as long as the greatest good is still maximized.
(7) Utilitarianism does not address the question of what kind of a person we should be. The focus is entirely on consequences rather than the character of people. For example, if I am offered a job as an assassin, I might think that killing people for a job would be OK because even if I do not take the job, someone else will. This means that whether or not I am an assassin, the consequences are the same, hence the moral value of either choice is equal.
The first three objections do not attack the theory but rather the practice of the theory. Objections (1), (2) and (3) are all objections that the theory is impractical and difficult (if not impossible) to use as a way of making moral decisions. Objections (4), (5), (6) and (7) object on the grounds that the results of utilitarian theory will conflict with strong moral intuitions or other reasons to consider when deciding if an action is good or bad.
Utilitarian Ethics 1: Intro
Now we turn to normative philosophy. Normative means that instead of just concerning what is the case, we are talking about what should be the case. A normative claim is a claim that asserts that things should be a certain way. Contrast a normative claim with a descriptive claim, which simply asserts that things are a certain way. e.g. "Natalie Portman was really thin in Black Swan" is a descriptive claim because it simply describes, whereas "Natalie Portman was too skinny in Black Swan" is a normative claim because there is also a judgment made about the state of affairs being described ("too skinny" implies that it was wrong that Natalie was so thin in the film). To say that a claim or a theory is normative is also the same as calling is prescriptive.
Ethics is one arena of normative philosophy. A goal of ethics is to tell us what we should do. There are a number of different approaches to the question of how we determine if an action is morally desirable. First, we can determine if an action is moral if the motive or the purpose of the action is good. Second, we can ask whether a certain rule or maxim has been followed by the action. Third, we can consider the results and consequences of the action and ask whether these results and consequences are good. This lecture focuses on the third approach, which we call consequentialism.
John Stuart Mill is a great example of a classic consequentialist. His view in particular is called utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the view that in order to determine if an action is good or bad, we must look at the consequences of the act. Specifically, we must ask whether we can expect the action to give us utility. Utility is very similar to happiness. A thing has utility if it causes us more happiness and pleasure than pain and sadness. In short, utility is net happiness (the happiness left over after we take away all the unhappiness). Mill's utilitarianism is not an egocentric or self-centered view. One must not just look at the consequences for oneself; one must also consider the consequences for other people. Utilitarianism thus requires that we have expectations about the consequences of our behaviors. Although we may not know the consequence until we act, we must consider the consequences that we do expect to happen. In short, what makes an action moral is to maximize net expectable utility. Actions are good if they tend to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
One objection to utilitarianism might be that it excludes the happiness or utility of animals from being relevant to moral considerations. Someone might think that it is not enough that an action promotes the good of human beings. Someone might think that we must also consider whether an action promotes utility for animals.
Greatest Happiness Principle: The greatest end or goal is to achieve the absence of pain and to maximize the quality and quantity of our happiness. We perform all actions in order to achieve this goal (this is a descriptive claim about what motivates our action).
Mill thinks that actions are right if they promote happiness and that actions are wrong if they promote pain or the lack of happiness (this is a normative claim that asserts that what is moral is what promotes happiness; Mill derives a moral normative claim from his psychological descriptive claim). In other words, if an action multiplies happiness then that action is good.
Happiness is used as a technical term in Mill. Happiness means pleasure. Mill talks about two kinds of pleasure, or enjoyment. Sometimes, he is talking about a kind of mental state, such as being happy or thinking that chocolate cake tastes really good. Other times, he talks about actions or activities that are likely to produce such pleasant mental states. Sven call pleasures that are mental states "subjective pleasures" and he calls pleasures that are activities or actions "objective pleasures".
Happiness is measured in two ways: quality (how good of a pleasure is it) and quantity (how much pleasure is there). Quantity is measured by how many people experience the good. We can also measure quantity by how long a pleasure lasts or how many time the pleasure is experienced. Quality can be measured in two ways. First, we can use a democratic method of determining which pleasures are better; the more people who think a pleasure is desirable, the better the pleasure is. For example, if more people think that eating ice cream is more desirable than eating bananas, then eating ice cream is a higher (better) good. Second, Mill thinks that pleasures that involve using our minds and our rational thinking are higher (better) than pleasures that only involve sensation. For example, using our reasoning skills to solve a math problem is a higher pleasure than eating ice cream.
Mill's Utilitarianism is a Universalism. This just means that we must consider the happiness of all people. This means that it is not enough just to consider consequences for our friends, families and neighbors. Rather, we must consider the consequences for all humans. Moreover, we must give equal weight to the utility (net happiness) of all people. This universalistic dimension of Mill's utilitarianism is indicative of the social justice issues that concerned Mill.
Mill thought that social reform could be motivated by utilitarianism. In the time in which he lived, he noted that happiness was not possible for everyone because the education systems and other social institutions were terrible. He wanted to create political change that could make happiness possible for even the lowest classes of people. He thought that disease could be eliminated through sanitation and education. Mill also thought that poverty could be eliminated by private charity and public welfare. He also thought that the higher pleasures of the mind should be encouraged by social institutions such as education.
We can sum up Mill's view in four main theses:
Consequentialism: whether an action is right or wrong is determined by the consequences of that action.
Hedonism: we do seek and should seek happiness. Utility is net happiness (the happiness that is left over after we subtract out our pains).
Maximalism: a good or right action produces the highest number of good consequences and the fewest number of bad consequences.
Universalism: we must give equal weight to the consequences for all people.
Motive vs. Intention. On the one hand, Mill thinks that our motive is irrelevant to whether an action is good or bad. Even if we want to do good, our action can still be morally bad if the consequences are bad. While the motive is unimportant to determine moral worth of actions, Mill thinks that intention is important to determine moral worth of an action. Motives may be used to determine if a person himself or herself has moral value, but the action is only good or bad if the consequences are good or bad. On the other hand, intention is relevant to the morality of an action. Intention is what a person wants to do by an action. In other words, an intention is just what consequences a person is trying to achieve by his or her actions. A motive is a feeling about why I want to do something whereas an intention is the consequences that I hope to bring about by my action. For example, if I bring in ice cream for all my friends, my intention is to provide my friends with ice cream, This intention is relevant. However, my motive is irrelevant; it does not matter if my motive is to make my friends happy or if my motive is to manipulate my friends by buying them ice cream.
Ethics is one arena of normative philosophy. A goal of ethics is to tell us what we should do. There are a number of different approaches to the question of how we determine if an action is morally desirable. First, we can determine if an action is moral if the motive or the purpose of the action is good. Second, we can ask whether a certain rule or maxim has been followed by the action. Third, we can consider the results and consequences of the action and ask whether these results and consequences are good. This lecture focuses on the third approach, which we call consequentialism.
John Stuart Mill is a great example of a classic consequentialist. His view in particular is called utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the view that in order to determine if an action is good or bad, we must look at the consequences of the act. Specifically, we must ask whether we can expect the action to give us utility. Utility is very similar to happiness. A thing has utility if it causes us more happiness and pleasure than pain and sadness. In short, utility is net happiness (the happiness left over after we take away all the unhappiness). Mill's utilitarianism is not an egocentric or self-centered view. One must not just look at the consequences for oneself; one must also consider the consequences for other people. Utilitarianism thus requires that we have expectations about the consequences of our behaviors. Although we may not know the consequence until we act, we must consider the consequences that we do expect to happen. In short, what makes an action moral is to maximize net expectable utility. Actions are good if they tend to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
One objection to utilitarianism might be that it excludes the happiness or utility of animals from being relevant to moral considerations. Someone might think that it is not enough that an action promotes the good of human beings. Someone might think that we must also consider whether an action promotes utility for animals.
Greatest Happiness Principle: The greatest end or goal is to achieve the absence of pain and to maximize the quality and quantity of our happiness. We perform all actions in order to achieve this goal (this is a descriptive claim about what motivates our action).
Mill thinks that actions are right if they promote happiness and that actions are wrong if they promote pain or the lack of happiness (this is a normative claim that asserts that what is moral is what promotes happiness; Mill derives a moral normative claim from his psychological descriptive claim). In other words, if an action multiplies happiness then that action is good.
Happiness is used as a technical term in Mill. Happiness means pleasure. Mill talks about two kinds of pleasure, or enjoyment. Sometimes, he is talking about a kind of mental state, such as being happy or thinking that chocolate cake tastes really good. Other times, he talks about actions or activities that are likely to produce such pleasant mental states. Sven call pleasures that are mental states "subjective pleasures" and he calls pleasures that are activities or actions "objective pleasures".
Happiness is measured in two ways: quality (how good of a pleasure is it) and quantity (how much pleasure is there). Quantity is measured by how many people experience the good. We can also measure quantity by how long a pleasure lasts or how many time the pleasure is experienced. Quality can be measured in two ways. First, we can use a democratic method of determining which pleasures are better; the more people who think a pleasure is desirable, the better the pleasure is. For example, if more people think that eating ice cream is more desirable than eating bananas, then eating ice cream is a higher (better) good. Second, Mill thinks that pleasures that involve using our minds and our rational thinking are higher (better) than pleasures that only involve sensation. For example, using our reasoning skills to solve a math problem is a higher pleasure than eating ice cream.
Mill's Utilitarianism is a Universalism. This just means that we must consider the happiness of all people. This means that it is not enough just to consider consequences for our friends, families and neighbors. Rather, we must consider the consequences for all humans. Moreover, we must give equal weight to the utility (net happiness) of all people. This universalistic dimension of Mill's utilitarianism is indicative of the social justice issues that concerned Mill.
Mill thought that social reform could be motivated by utilitarianism. In the time in which he lived, he noted that happiness was not possible for everyone because the education systems and other social institutions were terrible. He wanted to create political change that could make happiness possible for even the lowest classes of people. He thought that disease could be eliminated through sanitation and education. Mill also thought that poverty could be eliminated by private charity and public welfare. He also thought that the higher pleasures of the mind should be encouraged by social institutions such as education.
We can sum up Mill's view in four main theses:
Consequentialism: whether an action is right or wrong is determined by the consequences of that action.
Hedonism: we do seek and should seek happiness. Utility is net happiness (the happiness that is left over after we subtract out our pains).
Maximalism: a good or right action produces the highest number of good consequences and the fewest number of bad consequences.
Universalism: we must give equal weight to the consequences for all people.
Motive vs. Intention. On the one hand, Mill thinks that our motive is irrelevant to whether an action is good or bad. Even if we want to do good, our action can still be morally bad if the consequences are bad. While the motive is unimportant to determine moral worth of actions, Mill thinks that intention is important to determine moral worth of an action. Motives may be used to determine if a person himself or herself has moral value, but the action is only good or bad if the consequences are good or bad. On the other hand, intention is relevant to the morality of an action. Intention is what a person wants to do by an action. In other words, an intention is just what consequences a person is trying to achieve by his or her actions. A motive is a feeling about why I want to do something whereas an intention is the consequences that I hope to bring about by my action. For example, if I bring in ice cream for all my friends, my intention is to provide my friends with ice cream, This intention is relevant. However, my motive is irrelevant; it does not matter if my motive is to make my friends happy or if my motive is to manipulate my friends by buying them ice cream.
Ayer, Chisholm and Frankfurt on Free Will
Hello hello! I know I have not posted in a long time. Here is a short(ish) recap of the two lectures on which I have not posted. The main topic here is still free will.
Incompatibalists say that in order for us to be free, we must be able to have done otherwise than we actually did. We call this the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): an action is free if and only if the person could have acted otherwise. Because incompatiablists believe that everything is causally determined, they also believe that all of our actions lack alternative possibilities. A result of this is that incompatibalists think that we lack freedom.
Compatibalists will respond that we should interpret PAP in a hypothetical way: an action is free if and only if one would have done otherwise if one had been able to do so. Compatibalists think that the actually ability to do otherwise is not necessary for free will.
Ayer, for example, says that we should not contrast freedom with causal determinism. Rather, we should contrast it with physical force or constraint. Ayer thinks that being free is entirely compatible with the causal laws of nature. He thinks that freedom is incompatible with someone forcing you to do something or constraining your actions physically. For example, I can be free in spite of gravity but I cannot be free if someone locks me in a cage.
Ayer says there are three conditions that must be satisfied in order for an action to be the result of free will. First, if I had chosen to act differently then I should have acted otherwise. Second, the action is done without constraint or compulsion. Third, no one compelled me to do as I did. Ayer thinks that although we may live in a causally ordered world, there is still room for freedom so long as we would have done otherwise if it were possible to do so.
Chisholm objects to Ayer's view of free will. Chisholm thinks that it is not enough if a person would have done otherwise if he or she had chosen to do otherwise. Let's take the example of John Wilkes Booth's choice to shoot President Lincoln. Ayer says that this action is free if and only if Booth would have done otherwise if he had chosen to do so. Chisholm says that this is not enough. Chisholm says that the action is free if and only if Booth both (1) would have done otherwise if he had chosen to do so and (2) he could have chosen to do otherwise. Chisholm thinks that if it is not possible for Booth to have chosen to do otherwise, then his action is not free.
There are some problems with Chisholm's view. First, some think that it is silly to think that we can control what we want or what we choose to do. e.g. When I choose to run a red light, I am unable to choose to not run the red light because I can't help this overwhelming desire I have to drive fast and violate traffic laws. Second, some think that it is by the exercise of our freedom that we force ourselves into situations where we cannot act otherwise. e.g. If I am able to resist running the red light, it is only because I have trained myself and taught myself not to do so. In other words, I have created a situation for myself where I cannot choose but to obey traffic laws.
Agent causation vs. Event causation. Chisholm thinks there is another problem with determinism. He says that determinists talk only about causation where events cause other events. Chisholm thinks that there is another kind of causation: agent causation. In such cases, it is not prior events but a person who causes events to happen. Because determinism is only concerned with event causation, it does not rule out the possibility of agent causation.
Objections to Agent-Causation:
(1) Nietzsche denies that there is any such thing as agent causation. To say that an agent causes things is to say that the cause comes from nowhere, since the agent brings this new causal power into existence. Since nothing comes from nothing, this agent causation must come from something other than the agent's choice.
(2) Psychological objection. Agent causation is ultimately caused by some brain event. Hence there is no such thing as agent causation, since so-called agent causation is caused by an event in the brain. Chisholm responds: ah, but this brain event is caused by the agent! The person is still the ultimate cause of agent causation. But someone might ask further: how can both event causation and agent causation work together in a single person?
Libet's Experiments on Freedom. Libet constructed an experiment where people were told to choose to move their fingers and then also told to report when they were choosing to move their fingers. The findings showed that there was a slight delay between when a person actually began to move his or her fingers and when he or she claimed to choose to do so. In short, people were moving their fingers before they chose to do so. A simple interpretation of this experiment is to conclude that there is no such thing as free will; it is just an illusion. However, someone might note that there will be a gap of time between when someone makes a choice and when someone is able to report on that choice being made. Either way, there is nothing in Libet's work that indicates that our actions tomorrow do not depend on the choices we make today.
Harry Frankfurt comes in with further refinement of a compatiablist position. First, he distinguishes between first-order desires and volitions and second-order desires and volitions. First order desires are just desires to do something, such as my desire to drink peppermint tea. A second-order desire is a desire to have a desire, such as a desire to have the desire to drink coffee instead of tea. A first-order volition, or will, is just a successful first-order desire. For example, if my first-order desire to drink tea is successful and I do drink tea, then this is a first-order volition. A second-order volition is a successful second-order desire. For example, if my desire to desire coffee rather than tea is successful and I therefore drink coffee instead of tea, this is a second-order volition.
Frankfurt thinks that people who lack second-order desires and second-order volitions are wanton. A wanton does not care about his or her will but only follows his or her desires as they arise. Animals, for example, are wantons. Frankfurt thinks that what separates us from animals is our ability to reflect on and think about our desires.
Frankfurt thinks that a person is free if he or she is able to want what he or she wants to want. In other words, a person is free if he or she is able to have the will that he or she wants to have. A wanton drug addict, for example, who only has first-order desires and volitions is not free according to Frankfurt. Likewise, an unwilling addict who may have second-order desires not to do drugs but is unsuccessful in realizing these desires is also not free. Similarly, even the willing addict is not free because although the willing addict has second-order volitions, this is not because of a choice the willing addict has made. The desire a drug addict has to desire drugs will be realized whether or not there actually is a desire to desire drugs. Hence no drug addicts are free.
Strengths of Frankfurt's View: (1) It explains why we are better than animals, (2) It explains the will in terms of desire, which is simple to understand and (3) It explains why we want freedom of will (because we want to satisfy desires).
Regress Objection to Frankfurt's View: (1) If the goal is to have second-order desires and volitions, why not third-order or fourth-order, too? We can go on and on and have more reflective desires. This is the problem of infinite regress. Frankfurt responds: But there are desires that we identify with, we see ourselves as being made up of the second-order desires. Also, perhaps the second-order desires are determined, or caused by external events. On objection to Frankfurt here is that if our second-order desires are determined, then we lose free will.
Moral Responsibility vs. Free Will. Frankfurt says that the addict may not be free, but he is morally responsible. Frankfurt gives two conditions for moral responsibility: (1) a person must be able to predict the consequences of his or her action and (2) a person must have been able to have done otherwise. Freedom requires that we can control our second-order desires and volitions whereas moral responsibility merely corresponds, or goes along with, our second-order desires and responsibilities. Frankfurt thus reformulates the PAP: A person is not moral responsible if he or she acted only because he or she was unable to act otherwise.
Incompatibalists say that in order for us to be free, we must be able to have done otherwise than we actually did. We call this the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): an action is free if and only if the person could have acted otherwise. Because incompatiablists believe that everything is causally determined, they also believe that all of our actions lack alternative possibilities. A result of this is that incompatibalists think that we lack freedom.
Compatibalists will respond that we should interpret PAP in a hypothetical way: an action is free if and only if one would have done otherwise if one had been able to do so. Compatibalists think that the actually ability to do otherwise is not necessary for free will.
Ayer, for example, says that we should not contrast freedom with causal determinism. Rather, we should contrast it with physical force or constraint. Ayer thinks that being free is entirely compatible with the causal laws of nature. He thinks that freedom is incompatible with someone forcing you to do something or constraining your actions physically. For example, I can be free in spite of gravity but I cannot be free if someone locks me in a cage.
Ayer says there are three conditions that must be satisfied in order for an action to be the result of free will. First, if I had chosen to act differently then I should have acted otherwise. Second, the action is done without constraint or compulsion. Third, no one compelled me to do as I did. Ayer thinks that although we may live in a causally ordered world, there is still room for freedom so long as we would have done otherwise if it were possible to do so.
Chisholm objects to Ayer's view of free will. Chisholm thinks that it is not enough if a person would have done otherwise if he or she had chosen to do otherwise. Let's take the example of John Wilkes Booth's choice to shoot President Lincoln. Ayer says that this action is free if and only if Booth would have done otherwise if he had chosen to do so. Chisholm says that this is not enough. Chisholm says that the action is free if and only if Booth both (1) would have done otherwise if he had chosen to do so and (2) he could have chosen to do otherwise. Chisholm thinks that if it is not possible for Booth to have chosen to do otherwise, then his action is not free.
There are some problems with Chisholm's view. First, some think that it is silly to think that we can control what we want or what we choose to do. e.g. When I choose to run a red light, I am unable to choose to not run the red light because I can't help this overwhelming desire I have to drive fast and violate traffic laws. Second, some think that it is by the exercise of our freedom that we force ourselves into situations where we cannot act otherwise. e.g. If I am able to resist running the red light, it is only because I have trained myself and taught myself not to do so. In other words, I have created a situation for myself where I cannot choose but to obey traffic laws.
Agent causation vs. Event causation. Chisholm thinks there is another problem with determinism. He says that determinists talk only about causation where events cause other events. Chisholm thinks that there is another kind of causation: agent causation. In such cases, it is not prior events but a person who causes events to happen. Because determinism is only concerned with event causation, it does not rule out the possibility of agent causation.
Objections to Agent-Causation:
(1) Nietzsche denies that there is any such thing as agent causation. To say that an agent causes things is to say that the cause comes from nowhere, since the agent brings this new causal power into existence. Since nothing comes from nothing, this agent causation must come from something other than the agent's choice.
(2) Psychological objection. Agent causation is ultimately caused by some brain event. Hence there is no such thing as agent causation, since so-called agent causation is caused by an event in the brain. Chisholm responds: ah, but this brain event is caused by the agent! The person is still the ultimate cause of agent causation. But someone might ask further: how can both event causation and agent causation work together in a single person?
Libet's Experiments on Freedom. Libet constructed an experiment where people were told to choose to move their fingers and then also told to report when they were choosing to move their fingers. The findings showed that there was a slight delay between when a person actually began to move his or her fingers and when he or she claimed to choose to do so. In short, people were moving their fingers before they chose to do so. A simple interpretation of this experiment is to conclude that there is no such thing as free will; it is just an illusion. However, someone might note that there will be a gap of time between when someone makes a choice and when someone is able to report on that choice being made. Either way, there is nothing in Libet's work that indicates that our actions tomorrow do not depend on the choices we make today.
Harry Frankfurt comes in with further refinement of a compatiablist position. First, he distinguishes between first-order desires and volitions and second-order desires and volitions. First order desires are just desires to do something, such as my desire to drink peppermint tea. A second-order desire is a desire to have a desire, such as a desire to have the desire to drink coffee instead of tea. A first-order volition, or will, is just a successful first-order desire. For example, if my first-order desire to drink tea is successful and I do drink tea, then this is a first-order volition. A second-order volition is a successful second-order desire. For example, if my desire to desire coffee rather than tea is successful and I therefore drink coffee instead of tea, this is a second-order volition.
Frankfurt thinks that people who lack second-order desires and second-order volitions are wanton. A wanton does not care about his or her will but only follows his or her desires as they arise. Animals, for example, are wantons. Frankfurt thinks that what separates us from animals is our ability to reflect on and think about our desires.
Frankfurt thinks that a person is free if he or she is able to want what he or she wants to want. In other words, a person is free if he or she is able to have the will that he or she wants to have. A wanton drug addict, for example, who only has first-order desires and volitions is not free according to Frankfurt. Likewise, an unwilling addict who may have second-order desires not to do drugs but is unsuccessful in realizing these desires is also not free. Similarly, even the willing addict is not free because although the willing addict has second-order volitions, this is not because of a choice the willing addict has made. The desire a drug addict has to desire drugs will be realized whether or not there actually is a desire to desire drugs. Hence no drug addicts are free.
Strengths of Frankfurt's View: (1) It explains why we are better than animals, (2) It explains the will in terms of desire, which is simple to understand and (3) It explains why we want freedom of will (because we want to satisfy desires).
Regress Objection to Frankfurt's View: (1) If the goal is to have second-order desires and volitions, why not third-order or fourth-order, too? We can go on and on and have more reflective desires. This is the problem of infinite regress. Frankfurt responds: But there are desires that we identify with, we see ourselves as being made up of the second-order desires. Also, perhaps the second-order desires are determined, or caused by external events. On objection to Frankfurt here is that if our second-order desires are determined, then we lose free will.
Moral Responsibility vs. Free Will. Frankfurt says that the addict may not be free, but he is morally responsible. Frankfurt gives two conditions for moral responsibility: (1) a person must be able to predict the consequences of his or her action and (2) a person must have been able to have done otherwise. Freedom requires that we can control our second-order desires and volitions whereas moral responsibility merely corresponds, or goes along with, our second-order desires and responsibilities. Frankfurt thus reformulates the PAP: A person is not moral responsible if he or she acted only because he or she was unable to act otherwise.
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